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Abstract:
This paper explores the nature of secularism and how it is used and understood in France
and Turkey. I argue that governments can reassert their authority over their citizens by
controlling national identity and citizenship through the vessel of secularism. I assert that this
process creates tensions between citizenship and identity that are sharply revealed when
analyzing the discourse surrounding veiled women. This paper presents an overview of the
relevant literature written about this topic, then moves on to compare France and Turkey by
examining the history of secularism in both countries and how this term has changed over time.
In my analysis, I highlight how the evolution of secularism suggests that the term has been
shaped by domestic and global forces that have allowed both governments to redefine their
national identity and citizenship criteria. I conclude that the flexibility of the term enables these
processes to happen, paving the way for the debates about the Islamic headscarf to unfold.
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I.

Introduction
In recent years both France and Turkey have seen several controversies surrounding the

Islamic headscarf. France has since passed numerous laws, most notably the ban on headscarves
in public schools (2004)1 and the ban on the niqab in public (2010).2 In Turkey, the question of
the Islamic headscarves was reignited in the post-1983 period with students forming a political
movement protesting the abolition of the Islamic headscarf from university3 culminating in a
complaint brought by a student to the European Court of Human Rights which ultimately upheld
the ban (2006).4 While the conversation about headscarves has been utterly exhausted by
academics, politicians, and news outlets, this essay uses the headscarves as an outlet to explore
how secularism penetrates the lives of French and Turkish citizens. How does secularism shape
the lives of citizens, how does the government use secularism, what are the implications of
imposing secularism on religious people? I answer these questions by demonstrating that
secularism is a powerful source of governmental control which reveals tensions between
citizenship and identity that are especially apparent when examining veiled women. I argue that
secularism allows for governments to assert their authority over citizens by delineating the
criteria citizens need to follow to belong to the state, enabling them to marginalize groups with
legitimacy. France and Turkey present an interesting comparison because their populations are
very different in terms of religiosity demographics, thus highlighting how secularism functions
the same way regardless of how religious a population is.

1

Law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004.
Law 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010.
3
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 7 November 1982.
4
Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, no. 44774/98, § 44, ECHR, 2005.
2
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It is worth first defining secularism and specifically, the type of secularism used in
France and Turkey since the term itself lacks a universal definition. Generally speaking,
secularism is the principle of separation of the state from religious institutions. Despite this
understanding, the implementation of secularism is different depending on the country and the
time period. For example, the United States is secular but the public expression of religion is
tolerated: The president is sworn in on a bible and the phrase “In God We Trust” is inscribed on
the currency and judicial institutions. This is sharply different from the kind of secularism
discussed in this paper: ‘laïcité.’ This is a form of secularism specific to France but was then
replicated in other places, most notably, Turkey. Laïcité emerged in Europe to obstruct the
control of the religious establishment over the social and political spheres. It forbids public
displays of religious affiliation, especially in government-run institutions like schools. Both
France and Turkey employ the same form of laïcité (translated to ‘laiklik’ in Turkish), which
institutes ‘freedom from religion’ rather than the American ‘freedom of religion.’ Ahmet T. Kuru
characterizes this secularism as “assertive.”5 In distinguishing between the secular
administrations of France, Turkey, and the United States, he remarks that France and Turkey
display a more proactive approach to secularism compared to the United States’ passive stance.
Indeed, France and Turkey aim to exclude religion from the public sphere to ensure equality.
They believe that by relegating differences in religion, individuals can interact with “freedom of
conscience.”6 They assert that only when this is achieved can a modern democratic republic be

5

Kuru, Ahmet T. "Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies
toward Religion." World Politics 59, no. 4 (2007): 568-94. Accessed December 10, 2020.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40060173.
6
See 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.)
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established.7 Implicit in this concept of secularism is the guarantee of equality in public space
which is crucial in understanding how secularism shapes governance and citizenship. However,
it’s worth noting that secularism was never defined in either the Turkish or French constitutions.
The results of my work suggest that laïcité serves governments in shaping society to meet
an administration’s vision of national identity by curating citizenship to what they see as true
nationalism. The effects of this redefine people’s everyday lives and, more specifically how they
can express their identity. Tensions arise when individual identities clash with citizenship which
is imposed in public spaces through secularism to assure neutrality and equality, thus casting
non-conformers as ‘others’ or ‘foreigners.’
This paper will first discuss the academic literature which analyzes secularism in France
and Turkey, with some authors looking specifically at the headscarf debates. I will then move on
to present my case studies which analyze the process of secularization in France and Turkey.
This section will lay out the history of secularism in both places, then contrast this with how
secularism is understood today, using specific examples like the headscarf debates in France or
the LGTBQ struggles in Turkey to illustrate shifts in understanding. I argue that secularism has
taken on connotations of modernity which both countries emphasize when defining citizenship
through secularism. I highlight the edificatory role women play in maintaining their vision for a
modern citizen, expanding on the consequences of their central position in a secular society. In
the last section of my essay, I draw on the case studies to analyze how secularism functions as a
governmental tool to shape society.

7

Gokariksel, Banu, and Katharyne Mitchell. “Veiling, Secularism, and the Neoliberal Subject: National Narratives
and Supranational Desires in Turkey and France.” Global Networks 5, no. 2 (2005): 147–65.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2005.00112.x.
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II.

Review of Relevant Literature
A. What do the Headscarf Debates tell us?
The headscarf debates in France led many academics to question and analyze modern-day

secularism, has it changed, how had it changed, and for what reason? The literature points to
three key conclusions: for some, the revival of secularism during the headscarf debates was a
matter of preserving something that France feared would be lost. Others suggested that the
headscarf debates exemplified how secularism acted as a powerful mode of governance rather
than a simple principle. Lastly, some have combined these two arguments by asserting that
secularism, as a tool of governance and in the context of a nation plagued with anxieties, enables
politicians to redefine their country’s national identity, thereby categorizing certain citizens as
‘foreign.’ Most of these academics point to how the meaning of secularism is malleable and has
been manipulated to address current challenges.
When analyzing secularism in the context of the headscarf affairs, it has been noted how
secularism has been emboldened to guarantee certain rights, namely gender equality in the public
sphere. Both John Bowen and Joan Scott argue that secularism is seen as a guard against
communalism and female oppression. In his book, “Why the Franch Don’t Like Headscarves:
Islam, The State, and Public Space,”8 John R Bowen questions why the 2004 law in France was
passed and why it symbolizes such an important step in french society. His book tackles France’s
historical struggle between religious establishments and the state, public schools, citizens, and
integration. He weighs in on its colonial history, the role of the media in shaping the public's
understanding of the headscarves, and explains why the law was seen as a solution to

Bowen, John R. Why the French Don't like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space. Princeton, N.J, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2008.
8
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deep-seated social issues. Bowen argues that the focus on headscarves is rooted in France still
recovering from the trauma of the battle with the Catholic Church over public space, making
France particularly sensitive to questions of religion in public schools. Bowen also highlights
how the media catalyzed social anxieties about public expressions of Islamic identity and radical
Islam, cementing support for a headscarf ban law. He suggests that while the law was justified as
the protection of laïcité the rhetoric used by politicians, activists, and the media reimagined the
headscarf as symbolizing “communalism,” political Islam, and the oppression of women. Joan
Scott adds to the latter part of his argument about women, asserting that the veil debates in
France place its history with women at the center of the debate. In her book, “The Politics of the
Veil,”9 Scott explains the French understanding of gender equality as the ability to express
femininity and masculinity. Consequently, the French perceive the veil as oppressive to women
who are unable to publicly show their femininity. Sexual equality is then tied to laïcité as
something that needs to be guaranteed. Scott underscores how the French believe that their
insistence on sexual emancipation makes their culture inherently superior.10 She highlights how
this principle of sexual equality sits uncomfortably alongside the notion that “abstract
individualism is the basis for French republicanism.”11 She retorts, “if we are all the same, why
has sexual difference been such an obstacle to real equality?”12 Consequently, the veil is
emblematic of “Islam’s insistence on recognizing difficulties posed by sexuality revealed more
than what republicans wanted to see about the limits of their own system.”13 Ultimately, the
driving force of the headscarf debates was this desire to preserve the mythical ‘France.’ The

Scott, Joan Wallach. The Politics of the Veil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Ibid., 181.
11
Ibid., 154.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
9

10
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vehemence of the French population displayed in these debates against the headscarf was
arguably less about islamophobic fears of terrorism than about defending ‘real’ French national
identity-- and the relations between the sexes then became an explicit, symbolic and inviolable
component of that identity.
B. Beyond the Headscarf: Secularism as a governmental policy
Moving beyond the headscarf debates, academics have sought to understand how
secularism translates from an ideology into practice within society and what are the
consequences of this within a Republic like France. In her book “The Republic Unsettled:
Muslim French and the Contradictions of Secularism” 14 Mayanthi Fernando concludes that
politicians use secularism as a form of control. She argues that the mix of secularism and
republicanism is a mode of power and governance that is inherently contradictory and these
tensions are deferred on the backs of French Muslims. Viewing republican secularism as a form
of rule rather than a law that dictates which space religion is also to be expressed implies that
secularism necessitates two imperatives: privatization and regulation. She asserts that “the
confusions and conflations that secularization produces continue to figure the Muslim as a
subject in need of secularization. That project is never finished, which is precisely what
constitutes its regulatory force.”15 This regulatory force is in direct conflict with privatization
since it disrupts Muslim’s lives. In doing so, it negates the first imperative, the one that french
politicians claim secularism serves, that of privatization. By regulating Islam it is reducing it to a
religion that needs to be fixed rather than simply relegated it to certain spaces. She suggests that

Fernando, Mayanthi L. The Republic Unsettled: Muslim French and the Contradictions of Secularism. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2014.
15
Ibid., 23.
14
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Islam is seen as inherently flawed and France, through the mode of secular-republican
governance is able to redefine French boundaries so that Islam needs to redefine itself.
C. Secularism and Citizenship
Lastly, academics have built on the understanding that secularism is a powerful
governmental tool and politicians have recognized this and have used this to redefine who is a
citizen. Banu Gokariksel and Katharyne Mitchell argue that secularism is a powerful tool for
governing a population and one that is rooted in historical practices but is also used to support
neoliberal agendas in their article “Veiling, secularism, and the neoliberal subject: national
narratives and supranational desires in Turkey and France. ”16 They compare how France and
Turkey differ in how secularism is implemented and highlight how these versions align with
their history and current economic policies. In both countries, veils are cast as foreign to their
national narrative; in the case of France, this is linked to immigrants’ refusal to assimilate into
French culture while in Turkey it is seen as the rural migrants who fail to become ‘urban’ or
‘modern’ and are too attached to the pre-modern Ottoman past. By manipulating the rhetoric
around the veil to present it as archaic and foreign, it aids politicians to redefine their national
narrative as liberal, egalitarian, and democratic while justifying direct intervention into women
and migrant’s lives. It is thus, only through the protection of the state that women can become
autonomous individuals who can participate in political and economic life. The more historical
reason behind the importance of secularism as a tool is because it serves both countries as a
unifying tool and a way to bond the people to the state and each other. 17 They explain how there
was a double movement of upward scaling of authority at the level of morality and certain parts

16
17

Gokariksel and Katharyne op. cit.
Ibid., 153.
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of the populations but juxtaposed with this was a downward shift of responsibility onto
individual citizens to ‘chose’ to assimilate and become a patriotic member of the french republic.
18

Secularism allows for the national government to take over local hubs that are relatively

isolated and re-affirm their authority and those areas, demonstrating how the state is the ultimate
actor for social control and the sole source of national identity. This tactic enables governments
to off-set the hands-off role of the state during the neoliberal period. They also argue that
galvanizing citizens around the issue of the headscarf or veils in public schools recenter the
issues of national identity, integration, and unification in the debate, overshadowing the more
complicated, globally implicated socio-economic issues affecting immigrants and nationalism.
Lastly, the deflection of responsibility for assimilation to the individual, inscribed in the Pasqua
laws of 1993, continues with the general trend towards the ‘neoliberal’ revival of the
homoeconomicus, whose ambition to become a productive member of society is enough for them
to ascend the job market without any need for state intervention or collectivism19 Similarly, in
their book “The Headscarf Debates: Conflicts of National Belonging,”20 Anna C. Korteweg and
Gokce Yurdakul utilize Bowen’s works to explain the political impacts these debates have
generated. They look at the headscarf debates on a more global scale with the comparison of the
heated debate in France, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Germany. They conclude that the
headscarf debates provide an opportunity to rearticulate the national narratives that delineate
belonging in the contemporary era. The lens of national identity and belonging allows us to see
how these debates run deeper than questions of secularism or women’s rights; they are rooted in

18

Ibid., 155.
Ibid.
20
Korteweg, Anna C., and Yurdakul Gökçe. The Headscarf Debates: Conflicts of National Belonging. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2014.
19
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how a population sees itself and recognizes itself and others. The debates provide an opportunity
for politicians to reassert and redefine citizenship.
D. How a French Concept could be adapted to Turkey
This concept of redefining a foreign influence (which in this case was Islam or the
headscarf specifically) which is seen as a threat to national identity is an argument that Elif
Babül makes in “Bureaucratic Intimacies: Translating Human Rights in Turkey.” 21 Babül
examines how Turkey renegotiated universal human rights, branding it as a foreign intrusion into
local life. She explains how nationalist reactionary discourse in Turkey has defined human rights
as “a cover for treacherous activity against the indivisibility of the nation and the state.”22 Babül
provides some context as to why people were receptive to this analysis of something so universal
as human rights, explaining that the country’s history of political and economic instability
evidenced by the 1980 coup d’etat allowed for suspicion of outside forces to prevail. Turkey has
to implement human rights as it receives foreign aid and structural adjustment policies, and
needs to enforce these standards to secure the necessary funding. Turkey has effectively
redefined and rearticulated these universal standards to be more in line with the local
environment and more specifically, the government’s agenda and interests. Babul states that,
according to the Turkish government, these standards needed to function with the “sensitivities,
moralities, and rationalities that shape the governmental field in Turkey.”23 This literature further
points to how governments digest foreign concepts that they feel are a threat to national integrity
and by redefining them, reassert this national identity they feared they had lost.

Babül Elif M. Bureaucratic Intimacies: Translating Human Rights in Turkey. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2017.
22
Ibid., 128.
23
Ibid., 7.
21
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E. Concluding Remarks
This literature review has pointed to the centrality of secularism in national identity and
because of its role, it has had a powerful influence over society and the governability of society.
It has also been highlighted that secularism is a concept that has changed to adapt to various
political agendas. I will add to this literature by asserting that secularism is implicit in creating a
vision of society by controlling national identity and citizenship. This is seen by its changing
meaning throughout history how it’s increasingly placed as central to identity, thereby enabling
the state to control everyday life. This argument will be highlighted when looking at veiled
women in both France and Turkey.
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III.

Case Studies
A. France’s Laïcité
1. The Struggle for Laïcité in France
The history of laïcité in France demonstrates how the politicization of secularism is a

recent phenomenon that seeks to rearticulate the historical narrative about secularism to achieve
the political goals of French Nationalism. The history of secularism in France is important to
note because it demonstrates how secularism was not about the identity of the people but rather a
battle of power. The French Revolution of 1789 created the modern ideals of the nation-state
and citizenship, the foundations of which are rooted in the nations of liberty, equality, and
fraternity.24 It was after this event that two modes of thinking emerged: one emphasizes the need
for a national, public religion and the other prioritizes the freedom of conscience for each
individual.25 These opposing ways of thinking paved the way for a constant battle between the
religious establishment and those who opposed them, nourished by the thinking of Robespierre.
Ultimately, the end of the Revolution led to the latter way of thinking to take hold.26 However, in
the following decades, Napoleon would swing the pendulum back in favor of the Church giving
it limited power over society with his Concordat with the Pope, subsequently allowing for the
religious establishment to have control over primary education.27 Despite this attempt at
compromise, France’s society remained divided. Because of the role religion played in the
Revolution, it could not easily be relegated into the private sphere; There were still vivid and
bloody memories associated with the religious issue. The 19th century saw the government

Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University
Press. 1992
25
Bowen op. cit.
26
Ibid., 39.
27
Ibid.
24
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swing violently between pro-Catholic and pro-republic rule.28 Schools played a particularly
central role in the debates with numerous laws being passed to settle who should have control
over educational curriculums. Ultimately it was France’s defeat by Prussia that led to the
secularisation of schools since it was believed that “Prussian school teacher” won the war
through his superior teaching. It became an issue of national security to make french curriculums
secular.29 This culminated in the renowned Jules Ferry laws which firmly prohibited the Church
from infringing on education. It was only after this tug-of-war that the word laicity emerged in
the minds of the French people, although not yet in the law. Laicite was about financial affairs
more than anything else: how to finance religious building, schools, infrastructures, and
employees in the period following the 1905 law which put an end to the system of “recognized
religions.” It proclaimed the freedom of conscience and guaranteed the freedom to practice
religion. Yet this law still doesn’t mention the word laïcité. Indeed, it didn’t appear in French law
until the 1946 Constitution which read “France is an indivisible, secular (laïc), democratic, and
social Republic.”30 However, the term laïcité is never defined. It is undoubtedly because of its
ambiguous meaning that it is still contested and used in various political ways today. Despite the
assertion that laïcité is a unifying identity in French history, it is evidently more complicated than
that. It was originally a matter of diverging beliefs about the role of the Catholic church and
specifically the control over the young minds of french citizens. This historical understanding of
laïcité is starkly different from the one espoused by politicians today which seek to overestimate
its historical continuity. Bowen remarks that “ Not only has there never been agreement on the
role religion should play in public life—some in France hold laïcité to guarantee freedom of
Ibid., 4 0.
Ibid.
30
Ibid., 48.
28
29
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public religious practice, while others think that it prevents such practice—there is no historical
actor called “laïcité”: only a series of debates, laws, and multiple efforts to assert claims over
public space.”31
2. A Shift in the Understanding of Sectarianism
While historically sectarianism was about delineating where the Church should exert
power and defining the private space in which it should operate, current discussions of
sectarianism identify it as the ultimate characteristic of being a French citizen. This change from
focusing on religious quarrels to citizenship came about with the empowerment of the state to
control public space. The state has gradually come to associate secularism with the guarantee of
equality in the public sphere.32 In the public space, French citizens should uphold a collective
identity instead of communalist expression (thereby relegating religion into the private sphere),
to ensure freedom from pressures to join certain groups, and therefore creating a public space
where everyone is assumed to be equal. These ideas pushed laïcité to the center of what it means
to be a French citizen and a founding principle of french republicanism.33 Indeed Cecile Laborde
goes as far as to say that secularism “encompasses a comprehensive theory of republican
citizenship.”34 Instead of promoting equality through recognition and toleration of differences,
French republicanism strives to create a unified population underpinned by secularism in a way
that erases differences to protect equalities and freedoms. This citizenship mold enforced by the
state unifies the french population under the republic instead of under smaller group-based
identities.

31

Ibid., 52
Laborde, Cécile. Critical Republicanism : The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy. Oxford Political
Theory. Oxford University, 2008.
33
Korteweg and Yurdakul, op. cit.
34
Laborde, op. cit.
32
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The tensions and contradictions between ensuring equality while controlling private and
public spaces are laid bare when looking at the headscarf affairs. In 1989, when the first veil
affair occurred, the Conseil d’Etat ruled that the headscarf was "not by itself incompatible with
the principle of secularism, insofar as it constitutes the exercise of freedom of expression and
freedom of manifestation of religious beliefs."35 It affirmed that these issues of conspicuous
religious symbols should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis but that ultimately the veil was
compatible with the policy of laïcité in schools.36 They did note, however, that expulsion could
be justified if in addition to wearing the headscarf if the student has engaged in political activism
or disturbed public order by distributing brochures,37 circulating petitions or participating in
public protests,38 or didn’t consistently attend classes or disobeyed teachers.39 The court ruling
failed to put an end to the controversy because of how inconclusive the ruling was in establishing
a clear cut law, the veil affair was far from over. Education Minister Bayrou issued a ministerial
circular titled ‘Wearing of ostentatious signs in schools,’ stating, “These signs are, in themselves,
elements of proselytism, particularly when they accompany challenges to certain classes or
certain subjects, when they involve the safety of students or when they lead to disruptions to the
collective life of the school.”40 This opinion was strikingly different from that of the court,
labeling the headscarf as ostentatious, dangerous, and most notably, political in of itself.
However, the court effectively upheld its original ruling. The legal cases from 1995 to 1997

35

Conseil d’Etat [Council of State], Nov. 27, 1989, Avis no . 346.893.
Jones N. "Beneath the Veil: Muslim Girls and Islamic Headscarves in Secular France," Macquarie Law Journal,
2009
37
Cour administrative d'appel de Lyon, No 96LY02608, 19 December 1997
38
Conseil d'État No 170207 170208, 27 November 1996.
39
Conseil d'État No 159981, 10 March 1995
40
Jones, op. cit.
36
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resulted in approximately 60% of the girls’ expulsions being overturned while 40% were upheld.
41

The controversy was reignited on February 3rd, 2004 when parliament enacted a law that
prohibited the wearing of any conspicuous religious signs in public schools. This undid the
efforts made by the court to try and find a compromise. Another notable shift that occurred in
2011 when the ban on full-face covering in public was deemed constitutional by the Conseil
D'état. This is significant because it moves the suppression of the headscarf from a private space
to a public space. Not only that but polls show that 80% of France’s population supported the
bill.42 This demonstrates how the topic of the headscarf moved from something that divided the
nation to something that most people agreed went against the principle of laïcité. In addition,
France’s public watchdog group on discrimination, the High Authority for the Fight against
Discrimination and for Equality (HALDE), asserted that “The burqa carries the meaning of the
submission of women which goes beyond its religious scope and could be considered as
undermining republican values presiding over the process of integration and organization of
these lessons.”43 The rhetoric of female oppression and gender equality increasingly began to be
used by those opposed to the veil. Additionally, the veil was seen as going against the grain of
modernity in the West. André Gerin, who headed the commission to study the burqa, stated in an
interview with The Economist, "We will not accept that a particular religion: Islam or anything
else, occupying the public space and dictating its rules over civil society. That's what's happening

41

Ibid.
Jones, op. cit.
43
Diallo, R.. “Coronavirus exposed the real reasons behind France's 'burqa ban'.” Aljazeera, 2020, May 15.
Retrieved December 04, 2020, from
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/5/15/coronavirus-exposed-the-real-reasons-behind-frances-burqa-ban/
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with the fundamentalists...It goes against the entire history of Western Civilization."44 Just five
years later, the issue of face-covering was brought up again, in the context of burkinis. The
Riviera town of Cannes banned the full-body swimsuit on its public beaches. The then Prime
Minister, Manuel Valls, expressed his support for the bans, saying the swimsuit represents what
he calls a "provocation" and "an archaic vision."45
While French politicians claim it is a question of equality in public space, secularism has
effectively become a way of ruling over people and acts as a guard to proper french citizenship
in the sense of being able to operate in public spaces. Indeed, veiled women face increasing
amounts of discrimination in employment, education, and in general.46 The idea that wearing a
headscarf is contradictory to secularism or even french identity doesn’t imply that the French
believe there is something wrong with Islam itself, but the expression of Muslim identity goes
against France’s strategy of uniting people under the banner of nationalism which is at the core
of its ability to govern. It is effectively secularizing Islam itself and reasserting sovereignty over
a foreign population.47 Indeed with regards to its foreign population, France evaluates how
‘French’ immigrants have become, and only if they have fully assimilated can they be granted
citizenship. Every year, the government will reject one-third of applicants who are applying to
become a citizen, even when they meet the formal criteria for naturalization. The candidate must
demonstrate that they have “good morals,” but they can be still refused based on ‘insufficient
assimilation,’ if they don’t conform with french identity in how they dress, what language they
speak or how frequently they travel outside of the country, or in some cases, the position they

“Burqas in France.” The Economist. September 30, 2009.
Diallo, Rokhaya. “Hijab: a Very French Obsession.” Islamophobia News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, April 4, 2018.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/4/4/hijab-a-very-french-obsession.
46
Ibid.
47
Mayanthi, op. cit. 140
44
45
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have taken on Islam.48 The police check whether a candidate for citizenship via naturalization has
sufficiently ‘assimilated,’ and in their investigation can sometimes inquire into private manners
and habits. A Tunisian was asked why he had made the pilgrimage to Mecca twice. A lawyer
from Morocco was asked about the ethnicity of her friend group, how frequently she traveled to
Morocco and how many times a week she ate couscous.49
3. Who can be Considered a French Woman Under Secularism?
The veil has come to symbolize women’s oppression, embroiling gender in secularism,
pointing to how gender equality became central to France’s national narrative. This is seen by
how the conversation about head scarfs changed between the 2004 law and the 2011 ban. The
rhetoric surrounding the veil in school focused on women’s lack of agency while the discourse
about the burka underscored women’s lack of dignity. In the context of the veil, those who
opposed the garment suggested that even if women voluntarily wore it, it was an objective
symbol of submission. Feminist activist Zelensky, president of the Ligue du Droit de la femme,
asserted that: “Young girls or women wear it, invoking their freedom of religion. Wearing the
veil isn’t a sign of religious belonging. It symbolizes women’s place in Islam as it is understood
by Islam itself: shrouded in shadow, relegated to submission to men. The fact that women choose
to wear it does nothing to change its meaning…. There is no surer oppression than
self-oppression.”50 The veil seemingly takes its own agency, preventing women from
participating in the public sphere. It places the values of gender equality at the center of the
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debate and hence the center of France’s national identity. The concept of lost agency is
transformed into lost dignity when discussing the burka and niqab. Shortly after the Stassi
commission was proposed to look into the burka, the president, Nicolas Sarkozy, stated “We
cannot, in our country, accept women imprisoned behind a screen, cut off from all social life,
deprived of all identity. This does not conform to our idea of a woman’s dignity.”51 Through this
lens, veiled women are void of agency and dignity, and can only be saved by the state. Scott
comments on this discourse, highlighting how the French understandings of gender equality
emphasize difference, particularly when it comes to physical embodiment.52 Women’s lack of
agency comes from their inability to act in the public sphere, but the veil doesn’t prevent them
from acting or speaking, it just prevents their body from being exposed. Therefore, debates about
the headscarf, and particularly the burka or niqab, which hide certain parts of the feminine body,
reveal the emphasis on gender difference and its tense relationship with republican “sameness”
in the French national narrative.53 In this way, the headscarf and burka debates exposed
contradictions within the heart of the French narrative of belonging even as they reaffirmed the
centrality of republicanism, laïcité, and gender equality.
B. Turkey’s laiklik
1. The Legacy of the Ottoman System
In contrast to France’s long and bloody battle over secularism, Turkey’s secular model of
governance was not rooted in local debates but rather out of a desire to become a Western nation.
Even before the establishment of a secular Turkish Republic, the weakened Ottoman Empire
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wanted to replicate certain European practices. In the eighteenth century, they underwent what
was dubbed the ‘Tulip period’ where they planted tulips to emulate those in Versailles and tried
to start an industrial revolution in Istanbul like the one in France.54 This desire to ‘catch up’ with
Europe only emerged when the Ottomans began to lose against them militarily. Before then, they
had treated Europeans as political inferiors. For example in 1536, French king Francois wrote to
sultan Suleyman I asking for help to fight the Habsburgs. Suleyman wrote back to Francois,
addressing him as “Francis, king of the province of France,”55 while introducing himself as
the sultan of sultans, the sovereign of sovereigns, the dispenser of crowns
to the monarchs on the face of the earth, shadow of god on earth, the sultan and
sovereign lord of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, of Rumelia and Anatolia,
of Karamania and the land of Rum, of Zulkadria, Diyarbakir, of Kurdistan, of
Azerbai-jan, Persia, Damascus, Cairo, Aleppo, of the Mecca and Medina, of
Jerusalem, of all Arabia, of the Yemen and many other lands, which my noble
forefathers and my glorious ancestors— may God light up their tombs—
conquered by the force of their arms and which my august majesty has made
subject to my flaming sword and victorious blade, I, Sultan Süleyman Han.56

Following the Ottoman defeat in Vienna in 1683, and the loss of territories the Ottomans
gradually began to do things the European way. They decided to change their military to make it
more like the armies that defeated them. Thus the first secular school in Turkey was a military
school, the Imperial School of Naval Engineering. Gradually, the entire Ottoman army was made
up of secular-minded and Western-trained officers.57 When Ataturk emerged as the leader of the
Young Turks who liberated Turkey and made it into the secular Republic it is today, he was
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following a trend that had been implemented during the Ottoman Empire, and one that was
supported by Turkey’s most powerful sector, the military.
There were several reasons for deciding to barrow from France specifically. For one,
Ataturk was from the army so he had been trained and educated in a secular institution. He also
spoke French and was heavily influenced by mainstream positivists literature circulating at the
time.58 Partially due to the countless number of famous intellectuals, France had garnered a
reasonable amount of international clout, being viewed as a modern ‘civilized’ state. For Turkey,
France epitomized all the Western qualities it sought to bring home, and thus, both the Ottoman
Empire and Ataturk’s Turkey established many institutions in accordance with the French model.
There is arguably a difference between the Ottoman vision of utilizing secularism and the
Young Turks vision. While the Ottomans wanted to incorporate some of the European practices
to make their empire stronger, the Young Turks wanted to become European. The decision to
enshrine their new constitution on the principles of French laicite, w
 as emblematic of this desire
to move away from their Ottoman and Muslim identity. Like France, Turkey became a highly
centralized country, with a strong national identity. Another unsurprising similarity between
them was their secular model. Ataturk also used the freedom from r eligion approach and
relegated Islam to the private sphere. With this framework, laïcité set up a state-controlled
firewall between religion and politics banning religious symbols, such as the Islamic- style
headscarf, in certain public spaces. In addition to this, the Turks also put their own spin on laïcité
by codifying state- control over religious institutions by creating the Presidency of Religious
Affairs, Diyanet.59 This seemed like a natural course of action for the Turkish Republic, given
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that during the Ottoman era the Sultan was empowered to dismiss, and even execute, the highest
Muslim clergyman at his pleasure.60
2. Who is Turkish Under Secularism?
This rather abrupt shift towards secularism created contradictory tensions between the
Turkish sense of nationality and citizenship. Turkish identity was arguably constructed during
the Ottoman era. The Ottoman Empire was a multiethnic and multi-religious state which
organized its citizens into religious compartments, known as millets. This system was highly
successful in providing relative religious freedoms and stability in the region for over half a
millennium. This produced a stable social system that lasted around half a millennium. This left
an indelible religious marker in Turkish minds. This is further entrenched when in the nineteenth
century the empire faltered during the rise of nationalism. Particularly, when the Balkan
Christians turned to the nationalism which was shaped by the millet system hence centered
around religious identity rather than ethnicity. Indeed, these Christian Ottoman millets did not
see the Balkan Muslims as their nationals even though the two communities shared languages.
Therefore, as the Chrisitan states emerged in the Balkans during the territorial decline of the
Ottoman Empire, Turkish and non-Turkish Muslims in southeastern Europe fled persecution in
these newly emerging states, taking refuge in what is now modern Turkey.61 Once in Anatolia,
having been persecuted due to their religion, the surviving Ottoman Turkish Muslims unified
around a common Turkish-Islamic identity. Moreover, the immigration of Ottoman Muslims to
Anatolia enhanced the peninsula's Muslim and Turkish demographic base at the expense of its
Christian communities. While Christians made up one-third of the population in the 19th
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century, the large influx of eastern European immigrants shifted their demographic down to
one-fourth of the population by 1913.
Therefore, when the rump Ottoman Muslim millet coalesced into the modern Turkish nation,
Turkish nationalism embraced all Muslims in Turkey as Turks, while Christians were left outside
of the body of the Turkish nation. Since Turkish ethnicity was seen as conterminous with
Ottoman Muslim ethnicity, Ottoman Christians and other non-Muslim inhabitants have been
excluded from the Turkish nation, even when they spoke Turkish.62 The task of imposing
secularism on a nation in which identity is seen purely in religious terms becomes complicated.
3. Kemalism: the creation of Turkish citizenship
In the 1920s Ataturk moved to discard religion in order to focus on a voluntaristic,
territorial, and political understanding of nationalism. He based nationalism and citizenship on
three shared factors. Kemalism first dictated that Turkish citizenship is grounded in territory,
voluntarism, and a shared language: He emphasized the importance of a shared geographical
territory, stating “the people of Turkey, who have established the Turkish state, are called the
Turkish nation.”63 Secondly, he highlighted Turkish people have a shared history and a focus on
their common desire to be a nation. His party, the CHP, enshrined this in their constitution,
declaring that “the strongest links'' among citizens was “united in feelings and united in ideas.”64
Lastly, he underscored their “unity in language.”65 This was despite the fact that only 86.42
percent of the population actually spoke Turkish.66 Indeed, while part of Ataturk’s fabricated
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sense of nationalism rang true for some citizens, it was ultimately a superficial image of Turkey
and one modeled after Ataturk’s personal ideals.
These efforts were made to create Turkish citizenship and nationalism; a distinct category
from the imagined Turkish identity that was rooted in Islam. Indeed, even though Ataturk was
trying to create a secular national identity, he acknowledged in not-so-subtle ways, who Turkish
nationals were. He gave special privileges to “Turks'' over “Turkish Citizens.” For example, in
February 1924, parliament adopted a law exempting companies that belonged to Turkish citizens
from paying customs duties for ships and boats that they purchased as imports. When discussing
the law, it became clear that parliament had Turks, rather than Turkish citizens in mind: When
MP Wsmail Kemal inquired who parliament meant by Turkish: “Are we calling the Armenians
and the Greeks, Turkish?” MP Zeki responded, “They have never been Turkish.”67 This privilege
extended to Turkish people also applied to who is allowed to govern, publish opinions in the
media, or even be employed.68
When looking at the differences between Turkish who are largely ethnoreligious Turkish
and Turkish citizens who are non-Muslims Turks, secularism can more easily be understood as
not a way of removing religion from society or even Turkish identity but rather as an ideology of
how to organize and shape society. In November 1925, Ataturk carried out perhaps the most
symbolic of his secular reforms, banning all Turkish males from wearing the Ottoman fez, this is
a way for him to mold Turkish society to become more Western not less religious. Underlining
the "universal" characteristics and "international" recognition of Western clothes, Kemal
suggested that the clothing habits of the Ottomans, including the fez and the robe, actually
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originated in the cultures of non-Muslim and even "hostile" nations, testing their possible
rejection by society: "If it is permissible to wear the Greek head-covering, the fez, why should
not the hat be allowed? Once again I want to ask them and the whole nation how and why they
wore the special clothing of the Byzantine priests and Jewish rabbis, the robe?”69 Kemal ended
the identification of the Turks with the Ottomans through his implementation of the hat reform.
As Ernest Jackh stated "Ataturk uprooted the Turks from Ottomanhood with the abandonment of
ordinary caps and fezzes."70 Thus, while it might be understandable for "poor and ignorant"
villagers to live in an "uncultured" manner, because they might still be under the influence of
"tradition," it would be completely unacceptable for an urbanized and upwardly mobile
individual to have non-modern tastes and to pursue a traditional lifestyle, including the overt
display of Islamic identity whether in clothing or in the public performance of religious rituals. 71
Ataturk was able to achieve these reforms with minor resistance thanks to the weight of his
persona. After all, Ataturk -- who had just liberated Turkey from a massive Allied occupation -was considered nothing less than a father to all Turks.
4. Women’s edificatory role in the construction of ‘modern’ Turkey
Women’s issue is at the core of Turkey’s modernization. Because Ataturk sought to
transplant a model of western society, for the purpose of appealing to Europe, and what Europe
values. Elias Norbert outlines how at the time, there were certain imagined characteristics
associated with the West, stating “The concept of “civilization came to symbolize the

Göle, Nilüfer. The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013.
https://hdl-handle-net.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/2027/heb.04703. EPUB. 61.
70
Ibid., 61.
71
Gulalp, H. “Whatever Happened to Secularization? The Multiple Islams in Turkey.” South Atlantic Quarterly,
2003. 102(2-3), 381-395. doi:10.1215/00382876-102-2-3-381. 389
69

28

phenomena that make the West distinct from other contemporary yet “primitive” societies. 72 It
emphasized the opinion that the West was superior and assumed the universality of its Western
attributes in relation to its cultural values. It highlighted what is believed to be common among
‘civilized nations’.73 More specifically, it asserted the lifestyle of the European upper-class, who
saw themselves as the “standard-bearers of expanding civilization,” hence serving as a
counterpart to the other tendency in society, that of barbarism.74 In seeking to change Turkey’s
image and national identity, Ataturk employed a top-down social engineering approach, by
modifying what people wear and interfering in their everyday religious practices to appeal to
these values which buttressed ‘civilized’ in the eyes of European. His modernization was an
imitation of this and replied on the compliance of Turkish citizens to appear European. His
project of ‘modernizing’ society faced some resistance in rural areas, especially with veiled
women. The veil, like the Fez, was cast as archaic and therefore, Ataturk’s vision for a Western
Turkey rested heavily on the shoulders of women. Weiling the power of the state, Ataturk
liberated women from ‘religious and cultural constraints’ but simultaneously forced them to
chose between being culturally Muslim or Western. Nilüfer Göle, a Turkish sociologist who
specializes in the study of educated, urban, religious women asserts that the “Kemalist revolution
celebrated an “ideal woman.” Within the emerging Kemalist paradigm, women became bearers
of Westernization and carriers of secularism [...]. More than the construction of citizenship and
human rights, it is the construction of women as public citizens and women’s rights that are the
backbone of Kemalist reforms.”75
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5. Replacing Secularism with Social Conservatism
To a large extent, Kemalism is now dead. Turkey has embraced its Ottoman past and
Muslim identity. Symbolically, Atif Hoca, a cleric who protested the hat reform under Ataturk
and was sentenced to death was honored in February 2012 by having a hospital built after him,
who was one of the few symbols of resistance towards Kemalism. However, one aspect of
Kemalism which still lives on is top-down social engineering. In the same way that Ataturk
wanted to shape modern Turkey in his own image, his successor now wanted to do the same,
imposing his own worldview on Turkish society. Indeed, the transition to the AKP represents a
shift in power relations and encounters between the institutions and actors who have been
positioned as ‘others’ for almost a century-long. Ataturk’s principles represented the ideals of the
wealthy urban dwellers but not of the rest of the population, notably the rural population. He
created a sense of elitism by labeling the rural villages as "poor and ignorant" villagers to live in
an "uncultured"76 manner while he and his supporters were wealthy and urban. This split is still
deeply entrenched and can be observed in the recent 2011 elections where the CHP is still
favored in wealthier urban areas and the conservative Islamist party, the AKP, is favored in rural
lower-class areas. To take one example, in Turkey’s capital Ankara, the CHP securing 55 percent
of the vote in Cankaya, the wealthy upper-middle-class borough while the AKP received 55
percent of the vote in Ankara’s Kecioren borough, a district made up of mostly lower-class and
less wealthy citizens.77 This divide and silencing of the predominantly rural conservative
population paved the way for the later emergence of religious political groups that appealed to
the ostracized groups, a tension that still plays out under Turkey’s current president Erdogan.
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This party led by Erdogan gained 46.5% of votes in the 2007 general election and 49.8%
in 2011. The AKP rearticulated secularism and democracy to demonstrate that secularism,
democracy, and Islam were compatible. Indeed they came to power when Turkey’s society was
highly divided between the pro-secular and pro-Islam and the urban elite and rural peasants. The
AKP redefined its national narrative to create a sense of community and solidarity that is
inclusive of all religious and non-religious citizens, intolerance and discrimination, however,
were still perpetuated.78
6. How Erdogan played off of the Religious- Secular divide
When the AKP came to power, it first advocated getting rid of the Diyanet arguing that it
was an institution that allowed the state to control belief, going against the principles of
democracy.79 Yet despite this stance, the AKP now holds a lot of sway over matters of family,
women, children which have become the center of their policies.80 Since then, the Diyanet has
also become an extremely gendered political institution of the ‘yeni milli’81 and influential in the
implementation of the AKP’s values and policies that the AKP. This incident highlights how
Erdogan utilizes the politics prompted by the secular-religious divide to appeal to people but then
use secular institutions for his own agenda. Another example of this is how he uses the political
connotations that erupted out of this divide which associates conservatism with religion. This is
seen when European countries test to see whether immigrants have assimilated into ‘secular’
culture by showing them photos of two men kissing to see how they react. If they approve the
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act, they are considered as secular, liberal, open-minded; if not, they are categorized as religious,
conservative, and backward.82 Hence, sexuality, like gender in the case of France has become
embroiled in secularism. The AKP has similarly used this tactic. When they first came to power
in 2002, they rearticulated secularism so it would be in line with their conservative platform.
Erdoğan stated that the AKP ‘see secularism as a guarantee for democracy and as the basic
principle for social peace.’83 By doing this Erdoğan bridged the conflict between secularism and
religion, presenting his party as an advocate for secularism based on the rule of law. However,
when it came to implementing legal changes for the LGTBQ community, the AKP did very little.
Quite the opposite in fact, as during the overhaul of the Turkish Penal CodeIn fact, in 2004,
during the overhaul of the Turkish Penal Code, when LGBTI activists demanded to include the
term ‘sexual orientation’ in the provisions about prohibiting discrimination, the Minister of
Justice at the time, Cemil Çiçek, blocked this motion by arguing that the word ‘gender’ is
inclusive enough to imply LGBTI rights as well. Subsequently, the AKP took a much more
conservative stance on LGTBQ issues, repeatedly expressed their opposition to sex marriage
placing emphasis on ‘Muslim’ family values and norms. This change in stance again reflects
how the administration recognized the political connotations of both secularism and Islam,
reinforcing them and conflating Islam with social conservativism, placing nationalism and
‘Muslim’ identity at the center of their agenda.
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IV. Analysis
The long and complicated history of how secularism came to be implemented in France,
and to a lesser extent Turkey, demonstrates how secularism is not a self-evident term with a
linear history. The nature of how it was ultimately implemented in both these countries after
military defeats are significant. In the case of France, this came after a long and bloody struggle
with the Catholic Church which finally came to an end with the military defeat by Prussia which
was the straw that broke the camel’s back, finalizing the switch to secular education. For the
Ottoman Empire, the defeat in Vienna in 1683, prompted them to secularize their army. And
while Ataturk implemented secularism for a multitude of reasons, the defeat of the Ottoman
Empire undoubtedly added to the notion of ‘European superiority’ that was being articulated at
the time. It is not to say that religion was insignificant in the discussion of implementing
secularism, but suggesting that secularism does not necessarily have a history of being at the core
of national identity for either country. Indeed, the lack of definition of what secularism implied is
perhaps its more important quality. The implications of removing religion from education
because of a military defeat highlight how secularism was seen as a way of moving forward in
the trend of civilization. The connotations of societal superiority ensnared in military victories
have stuck with secularism. This way of thinking presents a very black and white vision of
secularism, with the supporters of it being viewed as progressive and liberal and those against it
being viewed as archaic and stuck in the past. By creating this dichotomy, politicians were able
to cover up political issues with secular language, painting themselves as inherently right. It's
associated with founding a nation based on modernity, this language veils deeper more complex
issues, often relegating them to the sphere of traditional or religious problems. This is why it is
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important to look at the history of secularism in both countries: to highlight how this narrative
was constructed and secularism is in no way linear but emerged out of a set of military and
ideological constraints.
The ambiguity and flexibility of the term made it more susceptible to embodying certain
values. During the era of Turkish modernization, secularism was necessary because it was
considered to be more than just a non-religious government, but integral to modern and civil
society. It was shaped by broader global forces like those at play in the aftermath of World War
One, and those international understanding immensely affected how secularism was understood
locally. In the case of Turkey, it was these additional connotations that allowed for Ataturk to
label certain groups as ‘backward’ or even ‘foreign.’ It was also these same connotations that
allowed Erdogan to garner support for his policies and to create a new nationalism and was able
to conflict Islam with social conservativism because secularism had been conflated with
‘non-traditionalism.’ In the case of France, these preconceived notions of modernity allowed for
French people to frame the veil as oppressive. Over the course of the debate, as the discourse
shifted away from veils inhibiting women’s agency towards its discounting women’s dignity also
demonstrates how the meaning of secularism is molded by domestic politics. Additionally, in
both countries, we have seen entities take on the responsibility of guaranteeing equality in the
public sphere under the umbrella of secularism. In Turkey, this would be the military who was
very closely associated with Ataturk himself and thereby secularism and Kemalism. Throughout
the years the military took on the role of guaranteeing and protecting secularism evidenced by
the numerous coups in the name of secularism affected over the years.84 In this case, secularism
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has evolved into a way of governing and an ideology that needs protecting. Similarly, in France
the state has taken on that role of guaranteeing freedom from religion in the public sphere which
also implies that secularism is seen as something in peril and in need of a security team, thus
placing the state at the center of people’s everyday lives.
The connotations that secularism has absorbed has allowed the government to mold
society and intervene in daily life. Not only does secularism dictate where religion is allowed to
exist and allowed to be expressed but since it is also an ideology seen as integral to a vision of
society as modern and civilized. The complicated history of rejecting the veil in education and
the burqa in the public sphere, allows us to demonstrate how secularism and the associated with
it has allowed the government to reassert itself over its citizens. In the case of France, it came to
signify gender equality thereby reaffirming ‘national’ ideas about femininity. By delineating
femininity, France hindered women’s ability to act as citizens in their own country: their reduced
ability to act in the public sphere but it also struck the core of their identity and how they must
express it. Through secularism, the state is able to penetrate women’s everyday lives. This
penetration is a contradiction to the state’s other obligation: to protect and guarantee certain
freedoms. Veiled women lay bare these tensions and highlight how the state prioritizes control
over its citizens to match their ideology of civilized society over guaranteeing freedoms
promised to their citizens. Similarly in Turkey, ideas about femininity were transplanted into the
country, forcing women to choose between their identity and citizenship.
Secularism aims to eliminate people’s ability to identify and rally behind an ideology
other than the national ideology. In France, Bowen concludes that secularism is seen as the
antithesis to what he calls ‘communalism’ which he explains is forbidden on French territory.
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For Turkey, Ataturk used secularism to create an archetype of Turkish citizenship, even if
Turkish identity was defined by religion. At the heart of secularism is its ability to govern
citizens that would otherwise identify with another ideology than nationalism. In both cases -Turkey more so than France emerging from a system where people’s identities were rooted in
religious differences -- was a desire to unite citizens of different backgrounds by suppressing
differences in the public sphere. For those who continued to identify with these groups,
secularism provided a clear delineation between the ‘other’ and the nationals. This concept of
foreignness is seen when discussing the veil. In Turkey, when the western-style dress was first
implemented, religious clothing such as the veil or The Fez was labeled as a foreign expression.
Likewise in France when people failed to assimilate to French ideologies they were seen as
failing to assimilate to French ideals and therefore, still foreign. Therein lies a conflict between
citizenship, which is governmentally monitored and created, and identity. This tension is
revealed when examining veiled women whose identity conflicts with their own citizenship.
When observing Turkey’s Kemalism and the transition to social conservatism, it
highlights how Turkish society did not become less religious, but rather how it acted as a mold
for Ataturk’s vision for modern Turkish society. Indeed, despite Ataturk's secular administration,
we had seen that true Turks were Muslims, and secularism was created to govern a different
class of citizens namely the non-Turks who were the Turkish citizens. This demonstrates how
secularism was a mode of governance aimed at a certain proportion of nationals. The category of
people who needed to be governed increasingly came to encompass other categories of people
namely veiled Turkish women living in rural areas. Similarly in France secularism increasingly
came to govern certain kinds of people namely veiled women. The ideology of secularism allows
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both countries to argue that they are governing everybody. The CHP successor, Erdogan,
provides an interesting example of how secularism is an efficient authoritarian tool and an
ideological tool, arguably removed from religion. Erdogan's ideological vision for turkey was
very different: he did not discard their Ottoman past and try and distance Turkey from the
Muslim identity; he did not wish to become European or Western although he did wish to have a
seat at their table. His view of Turkey's potential and of Turkish citizens was based on social
conservatism but he was able to easily manipulate secular institutions and the secular-religious
divide to implement his vision of society. He employed the same top-down way of governing the
everyday life of Turkish citizens and transformed their practices, their patterns, and the way they
dress. Under both Ataturk and Erdogan, religion among Turkish citizens as part of their identity.
What changed was how the leader’s view of what Turkish society should look like and who
could be part of it.
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V Conclusion
Secularism is a multi-faceted and regenerative term that has changed throughout history,
and will probably continue to change in the future. It contorts itself with domestic and
international pressure, burrowing itself into nationalism, identity, and citizenship. It is
unrelenting in its influence over how people understand their country and themselves; Because
of its complex yet powerful nature, it is important to understand how it functions and what it
really means. This essay sought to answer those questions.
The history of secularism in France and Turkey highlights how much the term has
evolved and how this change was not as linear or self-evident as leaders postulate when they
speak of secularism as the cornerstone of society. Indeed, secularism has mutated, absorbing
different meanings on the way, as a result of broader political conflicts happening globally and
domestically. Because of its ambiguity and flexibility, governments have hijacked the term to
promote their political agendas, reshaping society to their vision: Secularism became embedded
in citizenship, and controlling its understanding, meant controlling their populations. They
guarded citizenship, only allowing those who abided by their ideals to be considered proper
citizens. However, as highlighted in the discussion of veiled women, this created tensions
between identity and citizenship. The debates in France reveal the implications and associations
of oppression and lack of agency and dignity that are contrasted with a secular modern society.
Similarly, in Turkey, women’s ability to appear western reinforced the values associated with
secularism which was European’s view of modernity. Women were placed at the center of
secular versus religious because of the visibility of the veil, but how this piece of cloth came to
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symbolize various meanings -- backwardness, foreignness, oppression -- was a result of a long
history of reshaping both countries’ understanding of secularism.
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